Abstract: The objective of this paper is to set a framework for a reasoned discussion of hedge funds. I shall first describe what they are and what they do. The compensation arrangements for hedge funds would appear to encourage risk taking behavior that generates extraordinary returns.
Introduction
In a paper submitted to the Australian House of Representatives, the Reserve Bank of Australia indicates that it is very concerned about the activities of highly leveraged financial intermediaries known as "hedge funds" 2 . Their chief concern that these funds make money by attacking an exchange rate that has already overshot, so that it overshoots even further. The tactic is straightforward enough. By highly publicized actions and short selling, a bandwagon forms at which point the hedge funds pull out. This is what happened in the ERM crisis that hit the British
Pound back in 1992, the Asian currency crisis in 1997 and speculative attacks on the Hong Kong dollar peg in 1998. By their actions these hedge funds can hold small countries to ransom. So much is clear.
Or is it? On further analysis, the Reserve Bank is very vague when it comes to defining what it
means by a "hedge fund" and in fact a number of details in its submission to Parliament are incorrect. Dr. Grenville, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank actually hedges in his definition of hedge funds saying that "this terminology is probably more specific than we need to be to make the point." My intent is to try to set a framework for a reasoned discussion of hedge funds. I shall first describe what they are and what they do. There is some confusion on this point, which I hope to set to rest. The compensation arrangements for hedge funds would appear to encourage risk taking behavior that generates extraordinary returns. Interestingly enough, hedge fund returns are not extraordinary. They are not the gunslinging risk-takers of public perception. In fact, an analysis of the events of 1997 suggest, if anything, that they were somewhat gun-shy. We shall examine why this is the case. We shall conclude by examining their widely publicized role in the Asian currency crisis. Why this lack of clarity? Freedom from regulatory oversight comes at a significant cost. For regulatory purposes before 1996, hedge funds had to limit the number of investors to 99 to qualify for exclusion from regulations governing public issuance of securities, including restrictions on public advertising and solicitation of investors. In 1996, the number of investors was increased to 500 and rules have been broadened to attract individual and institutional money.
Hedge Funds: Myth and Reality
Hedge funds can accept money only from "qualified investors," who have $5 million in capital to invest, and a sophisticated understanding of the financial markets. In addition, they can accept money from institutions such as pension funds who have at least $25 million in capital.
However, the absence of regulatory oversight and restrictions on dissemination of information means that reliable information on hedge funds is hard to come by.
In the end, what most of us are left with are some anecdotes in the popular press that speak of the remarkable investment prowess of George Soros. In fact I think it fair to say that his widely publicised and by all accounts successful attack on the pound Sterling in 1992 led to a huge growth in the hedge fund industry. Investors who were closed out of Soros' funds anxiously sought out other hedge funds. Many trading desks and CTA funds simply redefined themselves as "hedge funds." The public perception was that all hedge funds were like George Soros, gunslingers on a global scale.
Recently, Will Goetzmann, Roger Ibbotson and I published an article in the Journal of Business on offshore hedge funds 6 . High quality data are available for these funds which we find are quite representative of the hedge fund industry taken as a whole. Surprisingly enough, in the period 1989-1995 hedge funds did not earn on average anything like the returns attributed to Soros. In fact, the average fund earned a good 300 basis points less than the S&P500 over the same period.
The risk was lower, and return per unit risk measured by the Sharpe ratio is favorable relative to that index. Interestingly enough, the Soros funds were larger, and their returns so far superior to those of the average fund, that the value weighted average return of all funds is more than 800 basis points greater than the S&P500. This only goes to show that Soros is the exception rather than the rule. To characterize all hedge funds as "global gunslingers" is to go beyond what the data can support.
This perception is confirmed when we break down the results according to style of management.
By whatever criteria we choose to use, it is true that global macro funds did better than any other style of management. In terms of absolute return, risk adjusted return or return per unit risk global macro funds experienced the highest level of returns. However, they are only one of many possible styles of management, some of which did only marginally better than the S&P500. On the basis of the numbers, it did not pay to have invested with short-selling funds, which experienced a negative return of 11 percent in a period when the S&P500 earned a positive 16 percent average annual return. In recent work we examine in greater detail hedge fund returns by Hedge fund fees are asymmetric and are designed to encourage the manager to take risk. In addition, for most funds there is a high water mark provision. In other words, the manager must make up past losses before they are entitled to the performance fee under their contract.
In other words, the manager is granted a call option, an option which goes into the money as the fund returns enough to cover past losses. As we all know, the value of call options increase with the volatility of the underlying asset. For this reason we would expect that the fee structure encourages hedge fund managers to take on considerable risk.
It is therefore something of a puzzle to understand why it is that hedge funds take on so little risk.
Not only do fund managers take less risk than we would anticipate, but also there is considerable heterogeneity across fund managers in the amount of risk they are willing to bear. In recent work 8 we show not only that funds vary in the amount of risk they are willing to assume, but that they vary risk exposure in different ways. Those funds with the lowest value at risk actually reduce their risk exposure at the time that high flying funds increase risk in the midst of the difficulties that LTCM faced.
Why aren't hedge funds the gunslingers that their fee schedules would suggest? My argument is that there is a reputation factor that offsets the obvious incentive to take risk. As it is, hedge funds are a little like radioactive substances. They have a half life of about two and a half years.
This is almost in the nature of being a historical constant, and applies to offshore funds, regular hedge funds and CTA's as well. The performance fee option is valuable only so long as the fund stays in existence. If by taking risk, the fund increases the probability that it will go out of business, the fund will moderate risk exposure rather than increase it.
The evidence Will Goetzmann, James Park and I have collected 9 suggests very strongly that those funds most in danger of termination decrease risk exposure. We find that those funds whose performance is relatively poor relative to other funds moderate their risk exposure rather than increase it. Evidence I have collected and that others have collected seems to find that poor performance is a reasonably good predictor of fund failure. Controlling for whether the fund manager incentive fee contract is in the money, we find using a probit regression procedure that both relative performance and the level of risk taken influence the probability of survival. I also find that the younger the fund, the more likely it is to fail. This indicates that reputation is a very significant factor. Particularly for younger funds, taking on additional risk increases substantially the probability of fund failure.
While in principle, the incentive fee arrangements appear to encourage gunslinging behaviour, such behavior incurs a significant reputation cost. In an environment where there is a high probability of fund failure, this reputation cost tends to dominate. For some funds, this cost may be so high as to eliminate any benefit from taking on additional risk. For this reason, many hedge funds are far more conservative than their incentive fee structures would suggest.
While some funds may take on considerable risk, George Soros among them, most hedge funds are simply not the gunslingers of popular imagination.
Hedge funds were responsible for the Asian currency crisis
While I have shown that hedge funds are not as a general rule global market manipulating gunslingers, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad and his friends still maintain that hedge funds were indeed responsible for the Asian currency crisis. Let us assume that he is correct, and let us see just how far this will take us.
In a recent publication 10 we have taken all of the funds on the TASS hedge fund database that claim to have maintained currency positions over the period of the crisis. Taking the total capitalization of these funds, we come up short on the amount needed to finance net inflows of $US 45 Billion in 1995 and 1996, and a net outflow of $US59 Billion in 1997. Taking all of the funds together we have an asset size of only about $US29 Billion. This is of course the total asset size and does not account for leverage. Of the managers we consider, only Swiss Bank reports its leverage at about 3.5:1, a little on the high side, but perhaps typical of the more adventurous hedge funds. We see that in order to have had a significant impact on the crisis, they would have had to have put a considerable amount of their leveraged capital at stake. We should be able to detect the impact of the crisis on their P/L. This is on the working hypothesis of Dr.
Mahathir that they were involved in the Asia crisis only to benefit themselves and their rich clients.
When we look at fund returns, we find no evidence of enrichment over the period of the crisis. In fact at the outset and height of the crisis, the funds were losing considerable amounts of money.
In August of 1997, the Ringgit fell 4.21% relative to the $US, while at the same time all of Soros' funds lost money. His flagship Quantum fund lost 7.43% of its value. In October of 1997 when the Ringgit fell 9.75% in value, it was the same story, with the Quantum fund losing 10.56% of its value in that month. On its face, this does not appear to be strong evidence of illicit enrichment, particularly when hedge funds would have had to expend a considerable amount of capital to influence events in that region.
We can take this analysis a step further. Let us continue to assume that Soros and company were responsible for the capital flight associated with the fall of the Ringgit. Since a very significant fraction of their leveraged capital must have been involved in this effort, we ought to find that their fund returns were sensitive to changes in the value of the Ringgit. There is in fact, almost no relationship. Using a Sharpe type analysis to estimate the total exposure to the Ringgit, we find that while the implied exposure changed through time, it had zeroed out at the time of the Ringgit's collapse. Of course, it is quite extreme to assume that Soros and company were solely invested in the Ringgit. We examine with weekly data the exposure of two prominent currency traders to the range of currencies: an Asia basket, Japan, Germany Britain and Mexico. Again, the evidence shows dramatic changes in net exposure to the Asia basket prior to the collapse of the Ringgit. However, at the time of the collapse these funds were virtually out of the market altogether. It seems that the period of the collapse was a period of high risk for these funds. They chose safe harbor from the storm.
There were periods when hedge funds had huge positive and negative exposures to Asian currencies, but these bear no relation to current, past or future moves in exchange rates. At the same time, we should be careful to note that our evidence does not rule out a currency flight There was in fact a flight of capital from Malaysia. However, there is no evidence whatsoever to support a claim that hedge funds in general, or any particular hedge fund, led the charge for the exits.
Conclusion
From a purely intellectual point of view, what is most fascinating about the Asia currency crisis is the fact that very intelligent people, people such as Dr. Grenville of the Reserve Bank of Australia whom I have the greatest respect for, accepted at face value the claims of Dr. Mahathir without stopping for a moment and asking whether there was any factual basis for these claims.
These claims are made on the basis of a variety of premises about hedge funds, each one of which is false. Even assuming these premises to be correct, we can find no data to support his claims.
From a point of pure logic, there cannot be any factual basis for any of these claims. Malaysia is fortunate in having a very fine and able Securities Commission. If there were any factual evidence at all to support a claim that Soros had intervened in the markets to bring down the Ringgit, it would have been produced by now. I should note that the silence is deafening. I suspect that what is really going on is that Soros was an expedient target of opportunity. The more noise made about outsider involvement, the less attention will be paid to those Malaysians who were anxious to get their money out of the region in August of 1997.
It is interesting to note that Dr. Mahathir's feelings about currency speculation have changed over the years. In late 1989 Bank Negara was using its inside information as a member of the club of central bankers to speculate in currencies, sometimes to an amount in excess of $1US billion a day. The US Federal Reserve Board had advised Bank Negara to curtail its foreign exchange bets, which were out of proportion to its reserves which at that time were about $US7 Billion. One has to wonder then whether Dr. Mahathir's new found religion on the subject of currency speculation has more to do with his humiliation back in 1992 than with the facts as they existed in 1997. At a psychological level, it does tend to explain why it was that the Prime Minister felt it necessary to make statements and commit to policies that had the effect of restricting almost entirely capital flows into Malaysia and damaging the chances for Kuala Lumpur to become a major center of finance in the South East Asian region.
